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Our review of the literature suggests that the effects of GATT/WTO are insignificant or 
relatively small for participants in general, but potentially very large for groups that make 
heavy use of it. Our empirical analysis suggests that these gains are disproportionately 
large for the Asia-Pacific countries—perhaps by reducing resistance to the rapid growth 
and change in trade patterns in the region. We  also highlight  a potentially important 
source  of  future  gains  through  helping  to  restrain  the  costly  growth  of  agricultural 
protection in rapidly-developing countries in the region.  
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The overarching official objective of the WTO is ― to help trade flow smoothly, freely, 
fairly and predictably‖
1. Since the inauguration of the multilateral trading system in 1947, 
trade  has  certainly  growth  rapidly—although  perhaps  not  always  predictably—in  the 
Asia-Pacific. Over the last quarter-century, exports from the developing countries of East 
Asia alone have grown at an annual rate of 13 percent per year, fast enough to raise their 
share of global exports from 3.4 percent to 10.5 percent. However, as Rose (2004a) has 
reminded us so forcefully, correlation is not causation, and careful analysis is needed to 
assess the extent to which the multilateral trading system has contributed to this felicitous 
outcome, and to the region’s economic growth more broadly. 
For the Asia-Pacific region, the role of the GATT/WTO has been complex. The 
United  States,  India,  Pakistan,  Burma,  Ceylon  (Sri  Lanka),  Canada,  Australia,  New 
Zealand,  and  Chile  were  contracting  parties  to  the  GATT  from  its  inception,  but 
important countries such as Japan and Korea entered the system much later (1955 and 
1967, respectively) while China’s participation  in  the  GATT  lapsed  in 1950 and  she 
acceded to the WTO only at the end of 2001– after 15 years of negotiations on (re)entry. 
It will therefore be particularly important to distinguish the implications of the system for 
countries with such widely divergent experiences. As background, Table 1 gives the dates 
on which a range of Asia-Pacific countries acceded to the GATT/WTO system. As noted 
by Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers (2007), these dates can be extremely misleading, since 
some signatories hardly participated in its activities while other non-signatory countries 
participated informally  in the GATT system  for many  years  without  acceding.  Some 
decisions on protection by some non-members, most prominently China, were strongly 
influenced by the prospect of accession to the WTO, as assumed by Ianchovichina and 
Martin (2004) in their analysis of the impacts of China’s WTO accession. 
One way in which the GATT/WTO may be much more important in the future 
than it has been in the past is through restraining effects on agricultural protection that 
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were not present under the GATT. There is a strong tendency for agricultural protection 
to increase as economies grow—a finding reinforced in an ongoing, large-scale study by 
Kym  Anderson.  Taking  this  into  account,  the  value  of  commitments  on  agricultural 
tariffs—even those at or above current applied rates—may be much greater than would 
appear to be the case when the conventional procedure of comparing bound with current 
applied rates is used. This may matter particularly with accessions, where some countries 
have made commitments that may have considerable value in the future. If, for instance, 
Japan had bound its tariff on rice at its then-current level of 46 percent on accession to 
the GATT in 1955 (Anderson, Hayami and Others 1986), this would have precluded the 
extremely costly subsequent emergence of rates of protection of close to 700 percent 
(OECD 2007). 
We begin by considering the operation of the GATT/WTO and how it might have 
influenced past trade policies in Asia-Pacific countries. Then we survey some of the key 
empirical  evidence  on  the  extent  to  which  GATT/WTIO  may  have  influenced  trade 
outcomes. Third, we present some new econometric estimates of the extent to which the 
system has actually influenced trade outcomes. Finally, we look forward, using a case 
study of China, at the potential benefits of WTO disciplines, particularly as they affect 
agricultural protection. 
 
II. How the GATT/WTO might have influenced outcomes in the Asia-Pacific 
 
The WTO system aims to operate by: (1) setting and enforcing rules for international 
trade, (2) providing a forum for negotiating and monitoring further trade liberalization, 
(3) resolving trade disputes, (4) increasing the transparency of decision-making processes, 
(5) cooperating with other major international economic institutions involved in global 
economic  management,  and  (6)  helping  developing  countries  benefit  fully  from  the 
global trading system. We consider first how the ― rules‖ functions of the GATT/WTO 
might  have  influenced  the  trade  and  development  options  of  Asia-Pacific  countries, 
before turning to look more specifically at the roles of negotiating and monitoring trade 
liberalization.   3 
Over the sixty years since the inauguration of the GATT in 1947, the rule-setting 
function of the multilateral system has probably been the most important for most Asia-
Pacific  countries,  although  the  negotiation  and  monitoring  of  trade  liberalization  has 
probably  received  the  most  attention.  Fundamental  rules  such  as  the  MFN  principle 
(Article I of GATT)–outlawing discrimination between suppliers– may have played an 
important  role  even  in  developing  country  members  that  did  not  make  extensive 
commitments  to  bind  and  reduce  tariffs.  So  too  might  provisions  outlawing  the 
imposition  of  higher  domestic  taxes  on  imported  goods  (Article  III)  and  the  general 
prohibition on use of quantitative restrictions (Article XI), although developing countries 
were able to use such restrictions with little restraint under Article XVIII:B until well 
after the Uruguay Round. The requirement under Article X to publish trade regulations 
might  have  contributed  to  transparency  in  international  trade.  And  Article  XXIV’s 
requirement that regional arrangements should cover ― substantially all trade‖ may have 
helped reduce the confusing and ultimately counterproductive proliferation of different 
preference margins that arose under preferential arrangements in the 19
th century. 
The  formal  dispute  settlement  procedures  of  the  GATT  probably  played  a 
relatively minor role simply because any contracting party, even the defendant, could 
block adoption of a dispute settlement report prior to the Uruguay Round. This changed 
after the Uruguay Round, and is widely thought to have greatly strengthened the dispute-
settlement function. Co-ordination with other international agencies was also relatively 
limited  during  the  GATT  era—and  to  this  day  the  only  substantive  mention  of 
interactions with other international agencies is to the International Monetary Fund in the 
context of balance-of-payments provisions.
2   
The  role  of  the  system  in  helping  developing  countries  has  turned  out  to  be 
something of a two-edged sword. One element—the unilateral granting by high-income 
countries of tariff preferences—increased the market access of developing countries to 
some degree, although there is much debate about the extent to which these preferences 
provided  meaningful  increases  in  market  access.  A  second  element  of  special  and 
differential treatment—waiving the obligation of developing countries to liberalize their 
                                                 
2 The Uruguay Round Agreement establishing the WTO includes a Ministerial Decision on improving 
coherence in global policy making through interaction with the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund. Winters (2007) concludes that this has achieved very little to date.   4 
own  trade  policies—may  well  have  reduced  their  gains  from  participation  in  the 
multilateral system by reducing the economic welfare gains resulting from liberalization 
of countries’ own trade barriers, and from greater access to markets in other developing 
countries (Hoekman and Ozden 2006). 
The  trade  negotiation  function  of  the  GATT/WTO  is  designed,  through 
commitments not to increase protection above agreed levels (tariff bindings in the case of 
merchandise trade), to contribute by reducing the barriers in and facing countries, and by 
increasing  the  transparency  and  predictability  of  the  trading  system.  As  noted  by 
Subramanian and Wei (2007), this function of the GATT/WTO has had a much more 
varied  and  interesting  career  than  is  frequently  suggested.  Many  note  that  the  first 
(Geneva) round of GATT negotiations was completed in only eight months, and that all 
rounds  of  negotiations  since  the  1960s  have  taken  considerably  longer.  This  view 
typically notes that the Uruguay Round, initiated in 1986, took around eight years from 
its formal launch, and 12 years from its initial, aborted launch in 1982. The Doha Agenda, 
initiated in 2001 after a failed attempt to launch at Seattle in 1999, has already taken 
almost six years, and may well take much longer.  
However, this perspective fails to emphasize the much greater ambition of the 
more  recent  rounds.  Martin  and  Messerlin  (2007)  found  that  the  three  rounds  of 
negotiations since the 1960s—the Kennedy Round (1963-7); the Tokyo Round (1974-79) 
and  the  Uruguay  Round  (1986-2004)—had  brought  about  much  larger  reductions  in 
tariffs than all earlier rounds (Table 2). Apart from the initial Geneva-I negotiations, at 
which it is frequently argued that the United States made greater commitments than other 
members in order to launch the multilateral system, the first five rounds resulted in only 
very modest tariff reductions. Not shown in Table 2 is the fact that these reductions were 
in only a small number of members, with developing countries, and countries such as 
Australia  and  New  Zealand,  being  unwilling  to  make  large  tariff  reductions  on  the 
grounds  that  they  needed  to  use  protection  to  stimulate  the  growth  of  their  infant 
manufacturing industries. 
As noted in Table 2, the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds brought about much greater 
reductions in tariffs in the northern hemisphere’s industrial countries. A large part of the 
reason for the greater success of these rounds in reducing tariffs appears to have been the   5 
move from a request-and-offer system to a formula-based approach (Baldwin 1986). The 
developing countries, and some industrial countries such as Australia, were exempted 
from the formula. Even in the industrial countries, many products were excluded from 
liberalization. Unfortunately, these exceptions disproportionately affected the products of 
export interest to developing countries, such as textiles, clothing and footwear. This may 
have been because the developing countries were not active participants in the exchange 
of market access concessions, and hence unable to effectively press for the retention of 
formula cuts on these products.  
By the beginning of the Uruguay Round, average industrial-product tariffs in the 
industrial countries were 4.1 percent, with an average tariff of 5.1 percent applied against 
the  exports  of  developing  countries,  and  3.9  percent  against  exports  from  industrial 
countries (1996). In developing countries, the average tariff on industrial products was 
18.8 percent, with a rate of 19.6 percent levied on exports from the industrial countries 
and 13 percent against developing country exports. While the industrial countries had 
bound tariffs covering 94 percent of their imports of industrial products, the developing 
countries  had  bound  only  13  percent  (Abreu  1996).  The  large  differences  between 
industrial and developing countries—and between products-- in the extent to which they 
liberalized under the GATT system were the apparent causes of the big differences in 
trade outcomes identified by Subramanian and Wei (2007). 
The Uruguay Round brought agricultural trade back into the WTO system. While 
many agricultural commitments were at levels substantially above existing applied rates, 
such  bindings  may  have  much  greater  value  than  first  appears,  by  restraining  both 
subsequent increases in protection, and volatility in protection rates. The Uruguay Round 
saw a major shift in the role of developing countries, with developing countries making 
commitments that would lower their applied tariffs on industrial products by an estimated 
25  percent,  and  increase  the  coverage  of  their  tariff  bindings  from  13  to  61  percent 
(Abreu  1996).  A  major  demand  of  the  industrial  countries  in  the  Doha  agenda 
negotiations has been further deepening of developing country commitments to liberalize. 
After  the  Uruguay  Round,  there  also  appear  to  have  been  some  significant 
changes in the operation of the accession process (Martin 2007). Prior to the Uruguay 
Round, many countries that acceded to the GATT after becoming independent were not   6 
required  to  make  any  changes  in  their  trade  policies.  Existing  members  were  also 
constrained in  seeking concessions  from  potential members since, if they  engaged in 
bilateral negotiations, they would be unable to threaten to invoke non-application of the 
agreement. The fact that informal membership was abolished as an option, and the much 
greater enthusiasm for membership in the multilateral trading system in general, greatly 
strengthened the hand of the existing members relative to new members. The incumbent 
members  have  generally  used  this  greater  strength  to  seek  more  liberalization  from 
membership candidates—something which is politically challenging to the candidates, 
but likely economically beneficial. While they have sometimes also used this power to 
protect themselves, as in the case of safeguards against China, there has not been large-
scale use of non-application as there was with Japan’s accession to GATT.  
One possible asymmetry in the effect of GATT/WTO on trade might involve the 
nature of the growth path of exports. Countries whose exports grow and transform rapidly 
are more likely to generate political resistance from established interest groups. It may be 
that  GATT/WTO  membership,  whose  rules  place  restrictions  on  the  extent  to  which 
countries  can  restrict  the  exports  of  dynamic  exporters,  are  more  useful  to  rapidly-
growing exporters than to those growing at a more leisurely pace. It seems possible that 
WTO membership might, in this sense, be more useful to dynamic exporters such as 
many of those in East Asia, than to those in other parts of the world whose exports have 
not been growing at the same pace. 
This brief survey of the activities of the GATT/WTO suggests that we should 
probably expect sizeable effects of this system on trade and growth outcomes since the 
1960s,  more  than in  earlier periods.  It also  suggests  a likely pattern of  greater  trade 
liberalization  under  the  aegis  of  the  GATT/WTO  in  industrial  countries  relative  to 
developing countries. But there is also a possibility that the GATT/WTO rules have been 
of greater value to more dynamic exporters, many of whom have been concentrated in the 
Asia-Pacific. 
 
III. Econometric Evidence on the Impact of the GATT/WTO on Trade 
   7 
A popular approach to assessing whether the GATT/WTO system has expanded trade 
uses the ― gravity model‖ to assess empirically the effect of GATT/WTO membership or 
participation on the countries trade, trade barriers or the variability of trade (see, for 
example, Rose (2004a;2004b;2005); Subramanian and Wei  (2007); and Tomz, Goldstein 
and Rivers (2007). This literature was initiated by Rose (2004a) with the surprising (to 
many) finding that the GATT/WTO had, on average, no significant effect on the trade of 
its  members,  except  through  preferences  granted  under  the  Generalized  System  of 
Preferences (GSP). In related papers, Rose (2004b;2005) examined whether GATT/WTO 
members had more liberal trade policies, and whether WTO membership affected the 
variability of trade outcomes. In all cases, he found a negative conclusion—that WTO 
membership did not significantly contribute to these intended goals. 
Rose’s provocative and challenging work stimulated a range of studies, many of 
which found significant impacts of the GATT/WTO on trade. The estimated significant 
impacts on imports or trade obtained in these studies are presented in Table 3.  
Subramanian  and  Wei  (2007)  re-examined  Rose’s  finding  using  import  data, 
rather  than  the  total  trade  estimates  favored  by  Rose  and  distinguishing  between 
industrial and developing countries, and between products. They found that the industrial 
countries that participated more actively than developing countries in reciprocal trade 
negotiations experienced large gains in their trade. For industrial-country members of the 
WTO, they concluded that imports were over five times higher than for non-members, 
and that this estimate is strongly statistically significant. By contrast, they concluded that 
the imports of developing country members are significantly smaller. Like Rose, they 
conclude that industrial countries granting GSP preferences increase their imports from 
preference-receiving countries substantially—although the dummy variable used for this 
analysis  does  not  seem  to  take  into  account  the  range  of  products  on  which  these 
preferences are granted.  
Subramanian and Wei also investigated differences in the sectoral coverage of 
WTO  liberalization.  For  the  range  of  industrial  products  that  have  been  subject  to 
liberalization—defined as beginning with a tariff of over 5 percent in 1989 and ending 
with  a  zero  tariff—they  found  that  imports  into  industrial  country  WTO  members 
increased very substantially and significantly (by 190 percent, with a t-statistic of more   8 
than six). The expansion in imports of these products from developing country exporters 
was 32 percent, with a t statistic of 2.7. By contrast, for clothing, footwear and food, the 
WTO membership dummies were either negative or insignificant. Finally, they examined 
whether new members of the system had increased their trade more than older members. 
With a cutoff date of 1990, they found significant positive impacts.  
Tomz,  Goldstein  and  Rivers  (2007)  took  a  very  different  approach  to  the 
definition of GATT participation. They noted that, in the GATT era (1947-1994), many 
customs territories were covered by the GATT system even though they were not formal 
members. In some cases, this was because they were colonies or overseas territories. 
Other economies were informal participants. While these participants did not engage in 
exchanges of market access during negotiations, they would have benefited from aspects 
of the multilateral trading system such as Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) treatment. With 
the scope of participation in the GATT/WTO system broadened in this way, they found 
that  GATT/WTO  participation  substantially  increased  trade  (by  71  percent  in  their 
benchmark case).  
Gowa and Kim (2005) use the same broader definition of GATT participation as 
Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers and focused on the 1950-1994 period, with comparisons to 
trade in the period between World Wars I and II. Like Subramanian and Wei, they used 
import data from the IMF’s Direction of Trade, rather than the total trade measures used 
by Rose (2004a). Like Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers, they found that GATT participation 
by  both  members  of  a  bilateral  trading  relationship  increased  trade—by  around  29 
percent. However, the industrial country members of GATT benefited much more—by 
113  percent  on  average.    And  the  ― privileged  group‖  consisting  of  Britain,  Canada, 
France,  Germany,  and  the  United  States  that  were  the  major  trading  partners  of  the 
founders  of  the  GATT,  the  United  States  and  Britain  benefited  by  an  estimated  292 
percent in their trade as a result of the GATT.  
All of the studies reviewed thus far took the traditional gravity model approach of 
focusing on non-zero trade flows. A number of recent studies have taken into account the 
fact  that  very  large  fractions  of  trade  flows  are  frequently  zero,  and  that  so-called 
extensive-margin growth associated with new trade flows may be an important dimension 
of trade growth.    9 
Felbermayr  and  Kohler  (2006;2007)  focus  on  the  extensive  margin  of  trade 
growth.  They  note  (2006,  p656)  that,  even  in  1997,  only  58  percent  of  total  trade 
relationships  involved  positive  levels  of  trade.  In  their  2006  paper,  they  show  that 
omitting cases with zero trade results in downward-biased estimators of the impact of the 
WTO on trade and their numerical estimates suggest this effect may be very large (2006, 
p670). Like Rose (2004a), they use average trade in both directions, formed by dividing 
all four potential trade flows for each bilateral pair of countries by four. They argue for 
this on the grounds that it avoids upward bias in trade values for distant country pairs 
resulting  from  inclusion  of  the  cif-fob  margin  in  the  value  of  reported  imports.  In 
Felbermayr and Kohler (2007) the focus is on the effect of the WTO on trade. Using a 
combination of a Probit model for the decision on whether to trade at all and a Tobit 
model to predict the level of trade, they find that, when both countries are WTO members, 
their trade is 31 percent higher than it would otherwise be (p.20). A surprising feature of 
their results is that the effects of GATT participation are greater when one economy is a 
member than when both are members.  
Xuepeng Liu (2007) also focuses on the extensive margin of trade growth over 
the period from 1948 to 2003, with a dataset designed to allow tracking of the extensive, 
as well as the intensive, margin of trade growth. Like Rose, he uses official membership 
of the GATT/WTO, rather than the broader concept of participation favored by Tomz, 
Goldstein and Waters. Following Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) he estimates in levels 
to avoid the need to delete or arbitrarily adjust the zero trade values prior to estimation. 
He uses the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood estimation technique which Santos 
Silva  and  Tenreyro  show  is  much  more  robust  to  problems  of  bias  resulting  from 
heteroscedasticity  in  nonlinear  models  such  as  the  gravity  model.  He  concludes  that 
GATT/WTO membership increased trade between members by 60 percent and between 
one member and another by 23 percent.  
Although it was not the focus of their study, Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein 
(2007) included a WTO membership dummy in their widely-cited study of extensive and 
intensive  margin  trade  growth.  They  conclude  that,  when  both  partners  are  WTO 
members, trade is 35 percent higher than it otherwise would be. A key innovation of their 
study is a two-step estimator that takes into account not only the distinction between zero   10 
and non-zero trade flows. It extends the Heckman (1979) estimator that is designed to 
deal with sample-selection problems to include an extensive margin in which increasing 
numbers of firms participate in trade. 
The estimated impacts of GATT/WTO on bilateral trade presented in Table 2 
show the wide range of results that have been obtained in those cases where significant 
coefficients have been obtained. Where a generalized WTO effect has been estimated, 
without distinction by country group or commodity, the coefficients tend to be between 
30 and 60 percent. Some results outside this range, such as the finding by Felbermayr and 
Kohler (2007) of a larger coefficient where only one member is a GATT participant seem 
surprising  even  to  their  authors.  However,  the  higher  estimates  for  particular  sub-
categories, such as industrial country WTO members or the Gowa and Kim ― privileged 
group‖, or East Asian WTO members, seem plausible given what we know about the way 
the GATT/WTO have operated. 
We remain concerned about some potentially important aspects of the estimation 
procedures used in current studies— and particularly the problem of sample selection 
bias and the approaches used to deal with it. The omission of the zero trade values has 
been  known  since  Tobin’s  (1958)  classic  paper  to  result  in  potentially  serious  bias 
because of sample selection. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) identify a potentially very 
serious problem of bias resulting from heteroscedasticity in nonlinear models such as the 
gravity model. The Poisson Pseudo-Maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator as a potential 
solution to this problem, appears to be robust to the heteroscedasticity problem in their 
Monte-Carlo  simulations.  However,  as  noted  in  Martin  and  Pham  (2007)  these 
simulations include no true zero values. While the PPML estimator appears to perform 
extraordinarily well in dealing with the problems of bias created by heteroscedasticity 
and  model  nonlinearity,  its  performance  in  dealing  with  limited-dependent  variable 
problems  appears  to  need  further  investigation.  Heckman-type  estimators  appear  to 
perform  much  better  than  alternative  estimators  as  long  as  exclusion  restrictions  are 
available. 
While the Poisson estimator seems likely to play a very important role in other 
nonlinear applications such as production functions, it is less clear that it is suited to 
dealing with the endemic zero problems in estimation of the gravity model. Martin and   11 
Pham  find  that  the  PPML  estimator  can  be  subject  to  serious  bias  when  a  sizeable 
fraction (say 40 or 50 percent of the sample) consists of zero observations. Martin and 
Pham  find  that  estimators  designed  specifically  to  deal  with  the  problem  of  sample 
selection are less subject to bias in these cases. In our empirical analysis, we therefore 
include two estimators designed to deal with the problem of sample selection bias. 
 
 
IV. The Benefits of GATT/WTO Membership in the Asia-Pacific 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the only study to date that includes tests for differences in 
GATT/WTO effects between regions is Rose (2004a, p107), which reports a positive and 
marginally  significant  effect  for  South  Asia,  and  no  significant  effect  for  East  Asia. 
Given the focus of this paper on the Asia-Pacific region of interest to PAFTAD, we 
decided to re-investigate the importance of GATT/WTO for the region. 
In our empirical analysis, we use the Subramanian and Wei (2007) dataset, kindly 
supplied by the authors through their web site. This dataset has advantages because it 
covers the long period from 1950 to 2000, in five year intervals. Further, it contains a 
substantial share of zero trade values, unlike the datasets used by Rose and by Tomz, 
Goldstein and Rivers. We follow Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) in using country and 
time  fixed  effects,  and  hence  omitting  all  single-country  variables  such  as  GDP, 
population and area. We consider a set of PAFTAD countries
3 that captures some of the 
countries of greatest interest to the region. The results of the analysis are presented in 
Table 4. Since the analysis closely follows Subramanian and Wei (2007), our discussion 
focuses on the policy variables related to GATT/WTO. 
The first three columns of results in Table 4 use the standard OLS estimator, 
ignoring the presence of zero-trade observations. The fourth column uses the Heckman 
(1979)  two-step  estimator  estimator,  which  deals  with  bias  resulting  from  sample-
selection problems by adding an additional variable—the inverse Mills ratio. The fifth 
and sixth columns are based on the Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2007) approach to 
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estimation,  which  adjusts  for  the  number  of  firms  that  will  export  (which  takes  into 
account potential gains from increased variety) as well as the probability of non-zero 
exports. In the sixth column, the standard Inverse Mills ratio is found to be implausible in 
magnitude so it is dropped in light of the evidence from Helpman, Melitz and Robinstein 
(2007) that this  variable is  less important than the export variety effect.  On balance, 
columns (5) and (6) are our preferred equations, although we will consider results from 
all specifications. 
If we focus on the WTO-related variables, we see that the dummy variables for 
WTO membership (WTO_Onein and WTO_Bothin) are economically and/or statistically 
insignificant in the OLS equations. This essentially confirms the findings of Rose (2004a) 
and Subramanian and Wei (2007) that generalized WTO variables have little explanatory 
power. The dummy variables for the PAFTAD region are, by contrast, extremely—in fact, 
implausibly—large and statistically significant. The results in the second column imply 
that trade between two countries that are both in the PAFTAD group is over 25 times 
larger than it would otherwise be. When we introduce the interaction terms for PAFTAD 
and the WTO, the coefficients on the PAFTAD variables decline. The interaction terms 
are  large  and  strongly  significant,  with  t-statistics  of  around  10  for  the  interaction 
between WTO and PAFTAD membership by both members of a bilateral trading pair. In 
the fifth column, with product variety taken into account, the coefficients on the regional 
dummies, as well as the WTO dummies, become insignificant. It is noteworthy that the 
coefficient  estimate  on  the  bilateral  distance  is  substantially  reduced  but  remains 
statistically significant, which is in line with the results found by Helpman, Melitz and 
Rubeinstein. What remains extremely important, and highly significant, is the interaction 
term between WTO and regional membership, which increases trade by a factor of four 
for countries falling into both categories. This suggests that WTO membership may have 
helped facilitate the rapid growth of trade in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
V. Prospects for WTO Disciplining Growth in Protection: The Case of Agriculture 
 
Standard approaches to the evaluation of WTO agreements begin by assessing the applied 
rate of protection in place before the agreement. They then examine the commitments,   13 
such as tariff bindings, made under the agreement. Where these commitments are below 
the initially applied rates it is assumed the applied rates will be reduced to respect the 
commitments. After comparing the bound and applied tariffs at the finest possible level 
of product disaggregation, the tariffs are aggregated to the level feasible in quantitative 
analysis. 
This approach seems a substantial improvement over the simpler approach widely 
used in earlier evaluations of trade reforms (see, for example, Brandão and Martin 1993), 
and still used in studies such as Polaski (2006), where the stylized nature of the tariff 
reduction is captured in a measure such as a 36 percent cut in applied tariff rates. While 
policy agreements are sometimes described in simplified terms such as this, the actual 
impact on applied tariffs is likely to be quite different from the description when the 
details of the agreement are taken into account (see Hathaway and Ingco 1995). Now that 
data on applied tariffs and bindings are available on an ad valorem basis for standardized 
commodities at the six-digit level of the Harmonized System, we can take into account a 
great deal of information that was ignored in earlier studies. This broad approach was 
used in Anderson and Martin (2006), and is now incorporated in the tariff analysis feature 
of software programs such as WITS (www.wits.worldbank.org).  
A key challenge for this type of analysis has to do with the counterfactual. What 
would applied tariffs have been in the absence of the agreement? Since it is agriculture 
that seems most resistant to reform, and where there are indications that protection is 
potentially increasing rather than declining, we focus on it in the rest of this section. 
There are two particularly interesting cases for analysis of agricultural trade reforms. The 
first  is  the  short-run  impact  of  the  tariff  reductions  on  variables  such  as  agricultural 
output, trade levels and farm incomes. The second is the long term consequences of these 
commitments.  
The  standard  approach  to  specifying  the  counterfactual  level  of  protection  is 
appropriate  for  short-run  analysis,  although  there  is  frequently  some  ambiguity. 
Ianchovichina and Martin (2004) for instance, assume that most of the tariff reductions 
associated with China’s accession to the WTO were actually undertaken before China 
joined the WTO, as China sought to establish her bona fides for the market-oriented 
WTO  system.  A  similar  ambiguity  arises  in  analyses  of  the  Doha  negotiations  with   14 
Europe’s pre-announced liberalization of agricultural trade policies. Should such policies 
be treated as part of the counterfactual, even though they are not locked in through WTO 
commitments and hence are potentially reversible? 
For analyses of longer-run impacts, the specification of the counterfactual is even 
more  challenging.  We  know  that  the  appropriate  counterfactual  depends  on  secular 
changes in both the level of protection of the type analyzed by Anderson, Hayami and 
others (1986) and in the variability of that protection over time (Francois and Martin 
2004). It also depends on the important questions raised in recent research by Melitz 
(2003) and Kehoe and Ruhl (2003): to what extent would a more liberal regime result in 
growth of exports and imports at the extensive margin—that is through the emergence of 
new varieties and new products—as distinct from through increases in the quantities of 
goods initially traded? 
In  the  case  of  China’s  accession  to  the  WTO,  it  is  particularly  important  to 
recognize  that,  prior  to  accession  to  WTO,  most  of  the  important  agricultural  trade 
barriers in China were implemented through measures such as state trading, import and 
export quotas and licenses, rather than through trade taxes (Ianchovichina and Martin 
2004). Tariff rates for imports of many commodities were high, while the protection 
actually  delivered  appears  to  have  been  very  low  or  negative  for  many  of  these 
commodities  (Huang,  Liu,  Martin  and  Rozelle  2007).  Studies  such  as  that  by 
Schmidhuber (2001), which use initial applied tariff rates, tend to overstate the short-run 
impact  of liberalization by overstating the amount  of protection actually  delivered to 
domestic producers. In this section, we draw on new estimates of protection actually 
delivered to producers and consumers in 2004, as provided by Huang, Liu, Martin and 
Rozelle (2008) for the major project on agricultural distortions led by Kym Anderson.  
In the long run, however, there is a risk that our standard approach to welfare 
evaluation may understate the benefits of reform. In the absence of commitments such as 
those China made under the WTO, it seems reasonable from the experience of other East 
Asian economies to assume that farm protection might have risen substantially for the 
political-economy  reasons  discussed  in  Anderson,  Hayami  and  others  (1986)  and 
Anderson (1995). It also seems likely that this protection would have varied more from 
year  to  year,  potentially  increasing  the  cost  of  protection  by  a  substantial  margin   15 
(Francois and Martin 2004). Further, the more liberal approach embodied under the WTO 
is likely to result in an expansion in the range of products traded (Melitz 2003).  
Our  empirical  focus  here  is  on  the  first  of  these  weaknesses  in  the  standard 
approach, although we address also the other two in a less formal manner. To do this, we 
take advantage of new assessments of levels and trends in agricultural protection in China 
and other East Asian economies emerging from a new World Bank project on global 
agricultural distortions (Anderson 2008). The estimates for the higher-income East Asian 
countries update and expand on earlier estimates of agricultural protection in the region 
(Anderson, Hayami and Others 1986), and estimates for the other 80 countries included 
in that project allow us to put it in a broader context. New estimates from that project for 
China (Huang, Liu, Martin and Rozelle 2007) allow us to examine the stance of China’s 
agricultural policies back to the early 1980s, when China’s current generation of farmers 
first became thoroughly responsive to market prices.  
 
China’s agricultural protection in international context 
There have been substantial changes in China’s agricultural distortions since the early 
1980s, with most of these changes reducing the earlier disprotection facing farmers. The 
changes have included reductions in taxation on exported products, reductions in 
protection to import-competing goods, and reductions in the taxation of farmers imposed 
through the procurement system. Much of the experience of China has been very specific 
to the national context of reform and appears very different from the evolution of policy 
in other East Asian countries. There are, for instance, major differences in the way that 
key policies have been used. The parallels between China’s policies and those of 
neighboring economies seem limited on issues like the use and abolition of the commune 
system; the introduction of the household responsibility system; the use and abolition of 
procurement quotas; and the importance of state trading. Another major difference has 
been in policies to promote technical change and changes in the composition of exports, 
which have allowed China to maintain the growth of agricultural output and to avoid 
dramatic increases in the import volume of key products such as grains.  
The direct impact of agricultural policies on farmer incentives was very negative 
when the reforms began but has diminished over the past 25 years. Another important   16 
influence on the incentive environment for China’s agriculture is protection to the non-
agricultural sector. Protection to non-agricultural sectors imposes an implicit tax on the 
agricultural sector by competing resources away from agriculture. As part of the process 
of WTO accession, protection rates to both agriculture and manufacturing were reduced 
substantially, and these reductions were locked-in through tariff bindings. The relative 
rate of assistance (RRA), depicted in Figure 1, provides a simple summary measure 
combining the effects of direct and indirect incentives. From the Figure, it is clear that the 
combined effect of reductions in direct taxation and indirect taxation through protection 
to other sectors outweighed the effect of reductions in protection to protected agricultural 
sectors in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and improved the overall incentives for 
agricultural production in China.  
Despite the differences between China’s situation and that of her neighbors, there 
are also important similarities. As noted by Anderson, Hayami and Others (1986) and by 
Lindert (1991), the political economy of trade policy tends to change in similar ways as 
countries develop. In countries as poor as China was in 1981, urban consumers care a 
great deal about the price of food and relatively well organized (Pinstrup-Andersen 1988). 
Farmers by contrast, are numerous but poorly organized. They also tend to be 
subsistence-oriented, selling only a relatively small share of their output in the market. 
Agricultural products tend to be exports, and hence easily taxed through direct border 
taxes or, as in the case of China, through state trading enterprises. The result tends to be a 
policy of taxation of agriculture of the type evident in our earlier discussion of China. 
Historically, import substitution policies and exchange rate distortions have resulted in 
protection of the non-agricultural sector, and hence additional, indirect taxation of 
agriculture.  
As economies develop and incomes grow, many of these elements change. Food 
becomes a smaller share of the expenditure of urban people. As countries become more 
urbanized, the urban community becomes more diverse in its interests and more difficult 
to organize. Farmers become more commercial in orientation, selling a larger share of 
their output in the market, which makes output prices more important to their real 
incomes. Further, they tend to use more purchased intermediates, which increases the 
leverage of an output price change on their net income. Finally, the share of the   17 
population engaged in farming tends to decline, making farmers easier to organize. 
Consistent with the theory of collection action (Olson 1971), commodities where 
production is concentrated in particular regions or where processing networks lower the 
cost of communication and organization are more likely to receive high rates of 
protection.  
However, the relationship between incomes and agricultural protection rates is not 
automatic, and appears to vary somewhat by region. Figure 2 plots the level of 
agricultural protection against the log of the level of income for a wide range of countries. 
The tendency for protection rates to increase with rising incomes is strongest in East Asia, 
particularly Northeast Asia, perhaps partly because the sample contains countries which 
have achieved relatively high levels of income, and partly because these economies have 
relatively limited agricultural endowments and hence concerns about self-sufficiency in 
key food products. What is clear from Figure 2(b) is that, despite China’s very different 
political history, its pattern of protection is consistent with that of the other North-East 
Asian economies, including – like the Republic of Korea and Taiwan (China) – a phase 
of negative protection and a rising trend.
4  
To the extent that there are common factors driving the evolution of agricultural 
protection in the four economies depicted in Figure 2(b), a key difference is the point at 
which WTO disciplines began to affect agricultural protection levels. In Japan, protection 
had grown seemingly without limit during its period of high economic growth, and only 
towards the end of the sample is there a suggestion of a slowdown in the rate of growth. 
In Korea, protection rates appear to have begun to plateau in the latter years, possibly 
under the influence of the relatively mild WTO disciplines to which Korea was subject as 
a member of the WTO. In China and Taiwan (China), the WTO disciplines negotiated at 
accession contributed—as discussed above and in Ianchovichina and Martin (2004)—to 
reducing protection to some degree. But more importantly in view of Figure 2, they have 
introduced disciplines on future increases in protection in China.   
There do not appear to be any respectable efficiency arguments for such 
protection. One distributional argument is that agricultural protection increases in the 
                                                 
4 Results in Anderson, Hayami and Others (1986) point to a phase of negative protection in Japan at a much 
earlier stage. For a theoretical analysis as to why it should not be surprising for China’s polity to follow this 
path, see Shea 2006).   18 
early stages of development partly in response to an emerging gap between rural and 
urban incomes during the course of rural development (Hayami 2007), but protection is 
inferior to many policy options that target directly such income differentials. Further, the 
observed pattern of protection has the undesirable feature of taxing farmers in poor 
countries, where their incomes are low relative to the rest of the economy, and 
subsidizing them in rich countries, where the income and wealth levels of farmers are 
frequently above national average levels (Gardner and Sumner 2007). 
Re-assessing the longer term impact of WTO accession 
In the light of Figure 2(b), the question arises as to how valuable WTO accession 
commitments are in limiting China’s protection growth. When Japan joined the GATT in 
1955, and Korea in 1967, few commitments to limit agricultural protection were made by 
new members. Japan’s and Korea’s average nominal rates of agricultural protection at the 
time of joining have been estimated recently to be 17 percent and 8 percent, respectively, 
compared with more than 100 percent today (Hayami and Honma 2007). China’s average 
agricultural protection at the time it joined in late 2001 was even closer to zero (Figure 1). 
In assessing the impact of WTO accession on China’s agriculture, to what extent should 
analysts take into account that binding its tariffs and subsidies at low levels potentially 
foregoes the losses that would have occurred had there been no such bindings? 
To obtain a better idea of the longer-run benefits of WTO accession, what is 
needed is to project the rates of protection that might have prevailed in the absence of 
WTO accession into the future (based on the estimates underlying Figure 2), and then to 
evaluate the effects of lowering this protection to actual post-WTO rates through that 
time period and discounting those increasing benefits back to the present.  
To make an initial assessment of the potential longer-term, advantages of China’s 
WTO commitments, we begin by examining a scenario under which China’s protection 
rates grow over the period to 2030 in a manner consistent with the international 
experience. Based on this evidence, we estimate a potential configuration of protection 
rates in the absence of the WTO agreement. These estimates are presented in Table 5. 
These estimates tend to be higher in products such as dairy products, where China does 
not have a comparative advantage, and where farmers are likely to become well   19 
organized. They are also quite high on products such as livestock products, in line with 
the experience of other North East Asian economies, even though China currently has a 
strong comparative advantage in the more labor-abundant agricultural commodities. 
To gain a rough idea of the implications of agricultural trade reform we 
considered two simple scenarios using the GTAP model of the global economy.
5 In the 
first of these simulations, we examined the implications of China’s reforms between 
1995—the start of the serious liberalization in preparation for WTO accession—and 2004, 
when trade policy for agriculture reached a much more liberal stance. From this point, we 
considered the impact of raising protection to the levels postulated in Table 5. This gives 
us two very crude estimates of the value of agricultural liberalization—one from an 
historical benchmark dataset, and another from a counterfactual level of protection based 
on projected future trends in protection.  The results for economic welfare are presented 
in Table 6.  
From Table 6, it appears that the contribution of agricultural trade reform to the 
overall welfare gain between 1995 and 2004 was relatively small. Agricultural 
liberalization accounted for under 10 percent of the total gains from the entire package of 
reforms in agriculture and non-agricultural tariffs. This reflects, in part, the small share of 
trade in China’s agriculture, and its relatively small share in output, if not in employment. 
When we consider the situation from the counterfactual identified in Table 5, the 
importance of agricultural trade reform increases very substantially. In this situation, 
close to 20 percent of the gains from trade reform come from reducing agricultural trade 
distortions.  
It is important to recall that the snapshot of protection in Table 5 would likely be 
part of a secular change in the pattern of protection. If the pattern observed in other 
countries were to be followed in China, then protection rates could go considerably 
higher than indicated in Table 5. In this case, the costs of protection are likely to rise even 
more rapidly, given that the cost of protection rises with the square of the rate of 
protection. As shown in Table 5, we project that the cost of protection to primary 
agriculture would increase by a factor of 3.5 with protection rising from its 1995-2004 
                                                 
5 We double the  Armington elasticities to capture the long run nature of changes in protection.   20 
counterfactual to our projected rates for 2030, while the cost for processed agriculture 
would rise by a factor of one and a half.  
The true costs of protection to agricultural staples are larger than they appear 
because so much of it is provided in forms that create variations in protection over time. 
As shown by (Francois and Martin 2007), changes in the square of the rate of protection, 
or in the intertemporal variance of protection, have equiproportionate impacts on the cost 
of protection. If we adjusted the cost of protection to primary agriculture for this factor as 
well, the increase in the cost from the original estimate would be almost five fold. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
In this study, we first noted the different roles of the GATT/WTO system: (i) to develop 
and enforce rules, and (ii) to provide a forum for negotiations on reducing trade barriers. 
We noted the large asymmetries in the use of the trade liberalization function between 
industrial and developing countries, and the much greater ambition of more recent rounds 
relative to earlier rounds. For the Asia-Pacific region, it seems likely that the provision of 
trade rules is particularly important, since many countries in this region are growing 
rapidly and changing their export mixes in ways that are inevitably seen as disruptive by 
established traders. 
We surveyed the evidence from the burgeoning literature that uses the gravity 
model to assess the impacts of GATT/WTO on trade. While the initial study by Rose 
(2004a) found no significant results, two subsequent types of studies have found positive 
results. Studies such as Subramanian and Wei (2007) have found large gains in trade for 
countries and products where there has been substantial liberalization. Tomz, Goldstein 
and Rivers (2007) have found smaller, but still statistically significant, gains when the 
definition of participation is broadened beyond formal GATT members to include those 
who participated informally under the GATT.  
In our empirical analysis, we used the Subramanian and Wei (2007) database to 
investigate whether formal membership in the multilateral trading system had an effect 
on trade in the Asia-Pacific region. We found, like Subramanian and Wei, that 
GATT/WTO membership alone was not significant. When we included a dummy for 
countries in the region covered by PAFTAD, we found that these countries traded much   21 
more than other countries. But when we added an interaction term between GATT/WTO 
membership and the PAFTAD dummy, we found a strongly significant and economically 
large effect. This may suggest that membership in the multilateral system has been 
particularly important in promoting the growth of trade in the Asia-Pacific region. 
In the final section of our paper, we focused on a potential prospective source of 
economic gains from WTO membership—the potential for ruling out the rapid growth in 
agricultural protection frequently associated with rapid growth in developing countries. 
To illustrate the potential importance of this phenomenon, we use a case study of China. 
The recent study by Huang, Liu, Martin and Rozelle (2007) provides information 
on the trends in protection in China’s agriculture, highlighting the fact that most parts of 
the sector have traditionally been taxed, rather than supported by policy. Related work 
drawing on the range of international experience in Anderson (2008) has examined some 
of the key trends in protection. Based on this, we create a projection of protection to 
agriculture in China in the absence of WTO commitments. Given the relatively low rates 
of protection prevailing in 1995, we find that the welfare benefits of agricultural reform 
contributed a relatively small part of the overall welfare gain during this period.  If 
protection to agriculture in the absence of WTO commitments would have followed an 
upward path similar to that in neighboring countries, however, then the relative 
importance of agricultural trade reform would increase considerably. 
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Table 1. Dates selected Asia-Pacific economies joined the multilateral trading system 
 
Australia (1948)  Malaysia (1957) 
Bangladesh (1972)  Mongolia (1997) 
Bhutan   New Zealand (1948) 
Burma (Myanmar) (1948)  Pakistan (1948) 
Cambodia (2004)  Papua N. Guinea (1994) 
Canada (1948)  Philippines (1979) 
China (2001)  Samoa  
Fiji (1993)  Singapore (1973) 
Hong Kong (1986)  Solomon Islands (1994) 
India (1948)  Sri Lanka (1948) 
Indonesia (1950)  Thailand (1982) 
Japan (1955)  Tonga (2007) 
Kiribati   United States (1948) 
Korea, South (R) (1967)  Vanuatu  
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.  Vietnam (2007)  
 
Source: www.wto.org 
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Table 2.  Looking for a "productivity" indicator of the Rounds 
 
   Dates  Length  Tariff cuts  Round  Number of GATT Members 
    (months)  [1]  "productivity"  All [3]  G77 [4] 
   1  2  3  4 [2]  5  6 
Geneva-I  1947  8  26.0  39.0  19  7 
Annecy  1949  8  3.0  4.5  20  8 
Torquay  1950-51  8  4.0  6.0  33  13 
Geneva-II  1955-56  16  3.0  2.3  35  14 
Dillon  1960-61  10  4.0  4.8  40  19 
Kennedy  1963-67  42  37.0  10.6  74  44 
Tokyo  1974-79  74  33.0  5.4  84  51 
Uruguay  1986-94  91  38.0  5.0  125  88 
[1] Average cuts in bound tariffs. Sources: Preeg (1970) Baldwin (1986) WTO (1994) WTO (2007). 
Import-weighted tariff cuts of industrial countries for industrial products (petroleum excluded) . 
The five first figures refer to the average tariff cuts of the United States only. 
[2] Average tariff cut per year of negotiations. 
[3] GATT Members at the end year of the negotiations (Source: WTO website). 
[4] G77 membership is taken as a proxy for defining "developing" GATT Members. 
 
Source: Martin and Messerlin (2007).   28 
Table 3. Statistically significant impacts of GATT/WTO on trade, (percent) 
   
    % 
Subramanian and Wei (2007p162-9)  Industrial ctry importer a WTO member  546 
 
Industrial ctry importer & partner WTO 
mbrs  175 
  Ind Ctry importer from Ind Ctry  209 
  Ind Ctry importer from Dveloping Ctry  164 
  Ind Ctry & liberalized import  190 
  Devel Ctry & liberalized import  32 
     
Gowa and Kim (2005)  GATT participants  29 
  Industrial ctry GATT participants  113 
  Privileged group  292 
     
Felbermayr and Kohler (2007, p32)  Both WTO participants  31 
  One WTO participant  144 
     
Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers (2007, p31)  Both formal GATT participants  62 
  Both nonmember participants  75 
  One formal & one informal participant  141 
  Both participate & at least 1 from E Asia  97 
     
Xuepeng Liu (2007, p19)  Two GATT/WTO members  60 
  One GATT/WTO member  23 
     
Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2007, p27)  Both WTO members   35 
  
Source: Authors’ compilation   29 
 
Table 4. The Impact of GATT/WTO on Trade of PAFTAD Economies, 1950 to 2000 
  OLS  OLS  OLS  Heckman  OLS  HMR 
Explanatory Variables               
Ln_distance  -1.218 **  -1.245**  -1.251 **  -1.294 **  -0.420 **  -0.509 ** 
  (-58.42)  (-59.87)  (-60.25)  (-56.90)  (-7.67)  (-7.49) 
Language  0.326 **           
  (8.66)           
Border  0.196 *  0.221 *  0.206 *  0.251 *  0.090  0.112 * 
  (2.26)  (2.54)  (2.38)  (2.88)  (1.13)  (0.80) 
Common Colony  0.579 **  0.703 **  0.690 **  0.702 **  0.111   0.171 * 
  (10.00)  (12.46)  (12.26)  (12.39)  (1.70)  (2.42) 
Current Colony  0.875 **  0.885 **  0.887 **  0.889 **  1.407 **  1.372 ** 
  (4.47)  (4.50)  (4.27)  (3.48)  (5.42)  (5.27) 
Ever Colony  1.323 **  1.524 **  1.529 **  1.571 **  0.981 **  1.033 ** 
  (14.84)  (17.42)  (17.41)  (18.27)  (11.79)  (11.87) 






















FTA  1.596 **  1.625 **  1.523 **  1.409 **  0.335  0.440 * 
  (7.77)  (7.65)  (7.22)  (6.54)  (1.58)  (2.03) 
FTA_WTO1  -0.227  -0.232  -0.095 **  -0.008  0.197  0.185  
  (-0.95)  (-0.95)  (-0.39)  (-0.03)  (0.83)  (0.78) 
FTA_WTO2  -0.844 **  -0.872 **  -0.741 **  -0.757 **  -0.185  -0.180 
  (-4.04)  (-4.05)  (-3.46)  (-3.45)  (-0.91)  (-0.88) 
GSP  0.454 **  0.461 **  0.468 **  0.443 **  -0.113 **  -0.071 
  (16.13)  (16.41)  (16.84)  (15.78)  (-2.98)  (-1.68) 
WTO_Bothin  0.098 *  0.076  -0.211 **  -0.249 **  -0.277 **  -0.274 ** 
  (1.99)  (1.55)  (-3.78)  (-4.12)  (-4.60)  (-4.55) 




































WTO_Bothin_PAFTAD1      0.755 **  0.771 **  0.219 *  0.261 ** 
      (8.37)  (8.04)  (2.24)  (2.62) 
WTO_Bothin_ PAFTAD2      2.349 **  2.378 **  1.481 **  1.569 ** 
      (10.67)  (10.08)  (5.96)  (6.25) 
WTO_Onein_ PAFTAD1      1.065 **  1.087 **  0.270   0.345 
      (4.95)  (4.72)  (1.12)  (1.42) 
WTO_Onein_ PAFTAD2      0.414 **  0.428 **  0.085  0.112 
      (4.64)  (4.52)  (0.89)  (1.17) 
Control for Sample              
    Selection Bias  No  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
    Inverse Mill’s Ratio (
* ˆ
ji  )        -0.017    0.402 * 
Control for Firm        (-0.22)    (2.13) 
    Heterogeneity  No  No  No  No  Yes  Yes   30 
Table 4. The Impact of GATT/WTO on Trade of PAFTAD Economies, 1950 to 2000 
  OLS  OLS  OLS  Heckman  OLS  HMR 
Explanatory Variables               
         
* ˆ
ji z           -4.267 **  4.635 ** 
          (-12.61)  (12.70) 
         
* ˆ
ji z
2          -0.600 **  -0.777 ** 
          (-6.57)  (-6.74) 
         
* ˆ
ji z
3          0.027 **  0.045 ** 
          (2.62)  (3.65) 
Constant  15.813 **  15.985 **  16.206 **  20.140   5.914  6.538 
  (37.08)  (37.42)  (38.21)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Time Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Exporter Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Importer Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
             
No. of Obs.  76094  76094  76904  102147  76094  102147 
             
R
2  0.70  0.70  0.71  0.71  0.71  0.71 
Notes: (1) t-statistics computed with robust standard errors and adjustment for clustering on the exporter pairs are in 
parentheses.  
  (2) FTA_WTO1=FTA*WTO_Onein and FTA_WTO2=FTA*WTO_Bothin.  
(3) WTO_Bothin_PAFTAD1 is defined as WTO_Bothin * PAFTAD1 when PAFTAD1 is a dummy which is 
equal to 1 if either the exporter or the importer (not both) is a PAFTAD country and to zero otherwise. 
WTO_Bothin_PAFTAD2 is defined as WTO_Bothin * PAFTAD2 when PAFTAD2 is a dummy which is equal 
to 1 if both the exporter and the importer are PAFTAD countries and to zero otherwise. Finally, 
WTO_Onein_PAFTAD1 is equal to WTO_Onein * PAFTAD1 and WTO_Onein_PAFTAD2= WTO_Onein * 
PAFTAD2.  
  (3) For the Heckman specification the dummy variable on Common Language is used as the excluded 
restriction variable in the Probit sample selection. The results remain essentially the same when we use dummy 
on Common Colonizer or Border as the excluded restriction variable.  
  (4) Following Helpman, Melitz and Rubeinstein  (2007)- we control for firm heterogeneity by including a 
polynomial in 
* ˆ
ji z . Specifically we first run the following Probit selection regression:  
 
} { ) var | 1 Pr(
* * * *
0 ji ji j i t ji dist iables observed T                 where  
j i t and   , are time, exporter and importer fixed effects, respectively and  ij   are a vector of exporter-importer 
dummies variables such as common language, border, …etc where the dummy on common language is the excluded 
restriction variable. We run the Probit sample selection regression to get the predicted probabilities of exports ji p ˆ . We then 
use  ji p ˆ to get  ) ˆ ( ˆ
1 *
ji ji p z
   and the inverse Mill’s ratio 
) ˆ (











 . Finally, 
* * * ˆ ˆ ˆ
ji ji ji z z    is a 
consistent estimate of  ] 1 | [
*  ji ji T z E .  
 
Source: Authors’ computations 
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Table 5. Potential agricultural protection in the absence of WTO commitments, China, 
2030 
 
  Conjectured Counterfactuals 
  % 
Paddy rice  100 
Processed rice  100 
Wheat  80 
Cereals  80 
Fruits & vegetables  50 
Oilseeds  10 
Oils & fats  10 
Sugar raw  150 
Sugar processed  150 
Plant-based fibers  40 
Crops nec  65 
Livestock  150 
Meat products  150 
Other animal products  20 
Other meat products  20 
Wool & silk-worm  40 
Milk raw  200 
Dairy  200 
 
Source: Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela (2008). 
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Table 6. Estimated welfare impacts of reforms from different levels of agricultural 
protection (welfare measure in 2004 US levels) 
 
  1995-2004  Counterfactual 
  $m  $m 
Primary Agriculture  385  1330 
Processed Agriculture  1589  2276 
National Total  20053  20125 
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Figure 1. Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-agricultural tradables, 
and relative rate of assistance,
























a The relative rate of assistance is calculated as  RRA = 100[(100+NRAag)/(100+NRAnonag) - 1], 
where NRAag and NRAnonag are the nominal rates of assistance to agricultural and non-
agricultural tradables, respectively 
 
Source: Huang, Liu, Martin and Rozelle (2007)   34 
Figure 2. Nominal rate of assistance to agriculture (NRA) and real GDP per capita 
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Source: Anderson (2008) 
 